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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GALE LEE BOONE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs.JOHN ,V. TURNER, 'VARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,

Case No.
12705

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
CASE
The appellant, Gale Lee Boone, appeals from a
deeision of the Third .Judicial District Court denying
his release from the Utah State Prison upon a Petition
for a 'V rit of I-Iabeas Corpus.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On September 5, 1971, Gale Lee Boone filed a
Complaint and Petition Seeking a 'Vrit of Habeas
Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, allebring that his commitment to the Utah State
Prison was invalid. The matter came on for hearing on
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October 21, 1971 before the Ilonorable Ernest F. TJaJd.
win, Jr., who denied the petition on October 28, 1971.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, Gale Lee Boone, seeks a re\'ersal
of the judgment of the court below with the direction
that he be released from the custody of the Respondent
upon a writ of habeas corpus or in the alternative a new
trial on the burglary conviction.
OF FACTS
On November J;j, 1960, before the Honorable
Stewart l\I. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial Dis·
trict, appellant plead guilty to the crime of Burglary
in the Second Degree. (R. 10) The record of the plea
and sentence indicates that appellant was represented
by Dean R. :Mitchell, Esq. (Exhibit 1, p. 2), and that
the court apprised the appellant of the fact that the
· charge carried a term in the Utah State Prison (Ex·
hibit 1, p. 3), an<l that knowing that he could be sen·
tenced to prison appellant still wanted to plead guilty.
(
I, p. 3)
At the habeas corpus hearing, the appellant testi·
fied that at the time of the plea he was nineteen years
old ( R. 34) and that he did not recall having had a con·
versation with his attorney in regard to his constitutional
rights, (R. 36, 39) and it does not appear that any other
rights were explained to appellant at the time of plea.
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It appears from the hearing that appellant had been
last released on parole 011 January 7, HHi9 ( R. 37) from
the bmglary conviction of 1960. Further, it appears that
a ppc llant' s parole was revoked prior to his conviction
of' the irnlictahle misdemeanor offense. (R. 37, 42) At
the parole revocation, it appears that the appellant was
represented by counsel ( R. 38) and that he was unable
to call witnesses in his behalf at the hearing before the
]foanl of Pardons (R. 37, 38) after having requested
the same. ( R. 40, 41)

POINT I
THE COUHT BELOv\T ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLAKT'S PETITION FOR A v\TRIT OF'
HABE.AS CORPUS BECAUSE HIS GUILTY
PLEA \VAS NOT INTELLIGENTLY AND
YOLlJNTARILY ENTERED.
From the record of the plea (Exhibit l) on No''embcr 15, HH>O, it is submitted that appeJlant was not
adequately informed of and did not knowingly and intelligently enter that plea. The record reveals that appellant was merely apprised of the fact that he faced a
possihle prison term if he plead guilty.No mention was
eYer made of the appellant's right to a jury trial; nor
of his right to confront his accusors and cross-examine
them; nor of his privilege against self-incrimination;
all 1ights guaranteed him under the United States Con-

stitution and required by Bo,1jkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 2:3 L.Ed.2d 27 4 ( 19()9) to be shown
as a matter of record. Boykin held that it was error on
the part of the trial court to accept a plea of guilty un·
less the record showed that the plea- was intelligent and
voluntary. The record in the instant case has no such
showing.
Although it is admitted that Boykin was decided V
years after appellant's plea of guilty and that various
courts have refused to give Boykin retroactivity, it is
submitted that due process requires that a plea of guilty
must he intelligently and voluntarily made and that if
the record shows the converse of Bo11ldn, that is, that
the record shows that the plea was not voluntary and
intelligently made, this court must reverse the lower
court and remand the case for a new trial on the charge.

It is submitted that the record, in conjunction with
. appellant's testimony, reveals that the plea of guilty
was not voluntarily and intelligently made. It shows
that appellant was 18 years old; and had not discussed
his constitutional rights with his attorney; that his at·
torney had advised him that the burglary charge would
be dismissed; and that he was not aware of his constitu·
tional rights at that time. From this it is submitted that
the record shows that his plea was not intelligently made
because he did not know what rights he was giving up
and that therefore the plea was not voluntary.
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POINT II
TIIE TRIAL COURT ERUED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
IL\ BEAS CORPUS ffECA USE AT APPELLANT'S HEARING ON
REVOCATION APPELLANT \iV AS DENIED DUE
PHOCESS OF THE LAW llECAUSE HE "\VAS
TIIE RIGHT TO HAVE \VITNESSES TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF.
It is submitted that in an administrative hearing
such as a parole revocation hearing in which an individual's liherty is at stake, the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constituion requires hat at least some
procedural due process he applied, and that due process
would include the right to have witnesses testify in his
behalf.

The United States Supreme Court stated in Golilbcrg 'l'. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 263, 25 L.Ed.2d 287,
2%, f)O S. Ct. 1011 ( 1970) that, "The extent to which
procedural due process must be afforded the recipient
is influenced hy the extent to which he may be 'condernnccl to suffer grievous loss,' " citing Joint AntiFascist llcfugce Committee v. JJicGrath, 341 U.S. 121,
Hi8, fl5 L.Ed.2d 817, 8:32, 71 S. Ct. 624 (1951) (Frankfurter, .J ., concurring.) It is submitted that appellant's
interest in preserving his liberty outweighs the governn1ent' s interest in summary adjudication because the nature of appellant's interest is one which is within the
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contemplation of the "liberty and property" language
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, it is submitted that at least some minimal due process would ap·
ply to appeJlant's parole revocation.
The question next becomes what minimal process
is due appellant at the re\'ocation hearing. It is submit·
ted that in the type of a hearing involved in this case
clue process includes the right to present e''idence con·
troverting the evidence presented against him hy the
State. The case of JI orri.<;scy v. JJren:cr, ...... U.S ....... , 33
L.Ed.2d 484, H2 S.Ct. ______ ( .T tme 29, 1 !)72), decided that
minimum requirements of due process inclU<les (among
other rights) the "opportunity to he heard in person
and to present r.cil ncRsc.<; and documentary evidence."
( 33 L.Ed.2d at 499) (emphasis added). Although it
is admitted that
orriss{ ?J by its own words is '·applicable to future revocations of parole," it is submitted
that the right to present evidence in one's defense at a
· parole revocation is so fundamental to a fair hearing
and to substantial justice that this court must find that
appellant was denied due process at his parole re,·ora·
tioH hearing. Further it is submitted that ll/orrissr!J is
evidence of what a person in appellant's shoes should
have been afforded at a hearing on parole revocation.
The mere coincidence that appellant's hearing was hatl
before IJiorrissey was decided should not deter this court
from affording appellant at least the right to defend
himself when his liberty is threatened.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that appellant did
not enter his plea of guilty knowingly, intelligently and
rnluntarily because he did not know the consequences
of his plea and because he was denied fundamental due
prnccss at his parole revocation hearing by being denied
the right to call witnesses at his hearing, appellant respectfully submits that the judgment and order of the
court below should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

GREGORY L. BOWN

Attorney for Appellant

